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Previous research on dual-tasks has shown that, under some circumstances, actions impair the perception
of action-consistent stimuli, whereas, under other conditions, actions facilitate the perception of action-
consistent stimuli. We propose a new model to reconcile these contrasting findings. The planning and
control model (PCM) of motorvisual priming proposes that action planning binds categorical represen-
tations of action features so that their availability for perceptual processing is inhibited. Thus, the
perception of categorically action-consistent stimuli is impaired during action planning. Movement
control processes, on the other hand, integrate multi-sensory spatial information about the movement and,
therefore, facilitate perceptual processing of spatially movement-consistent stimuli. We show that the
PCM is consistent with a wider range of empirical data than previous models on motorvisual priming.
Furthermore, the model yields previously untested empirical predictions. We also discuss how the PCM
relates to motorvisual research paradigms other than dual-tasks.
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Experimental studies in human information processing have
been mostly concerned with the impact of perceptual processes on
action. However, for two decades or so, effects in the opposite
direction—from action on perception—have also been intensely
investigated. Among the most prominent research paradigms in
this field are motorvisual dual-tasks (see Schu¨tz-Bosbach & Prinz,
2007, for a review). In a typical motorvisual dual-task, participants
respond in one task with one response (R1), according to a fixed
stimulus-response mapping to one stimulus (S1), while they detect
or identify, in a secondary task, a difficult to discriminate second
stimulus event (S2) and report it by a further response (R2). The
experimenter varies whether R1 and S2 are consistent (i.e., share
a certain feature, such as location or semantic meaning) or incon-
sistent (i.e., contrast with respect to a certain feature; see Figure 1).
An effect of R1–S2 consistency on secondary task performance is
commonly interpreted as evidence for a direct impact from motor
processing (R1) on perceptual processing (S2; see Schu¨tz-Bosbach
& Prinz, 2007). In recent years, a variety of motorvisual effects has
been demonstrated by such dual-task paradigms (e.g., Baldauf &
Deubel, 2008; Hommel & Mu¨sseler, 2006; James & Gauthier,
2009; Pfister, Heinemann, Kiesel, Thomaschke, & Janczyk, 2011),
yet with contrasting effect directions.
In one set of studies, R1–S2 consistency impaired S2 perception
(e.g., Kunde & Wu¨hr, 2004; Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997;
Nishimura & Yokosawa, 2010; Oriet, Stevanovski, Jolicœur, &
Cowan, 2003; Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolicœur, 2006). In a study by
Mu¨sseler and Hommel (1997), for example, participants pressed a
left or right key (R1) in response to a left- or right-pointing
(respectively) arrowhead (S1) while they had to also identify the
direction of a very briefly presented second arrowhead (S2). In-
correct judgments (R2) about S2 direction were more frequent
when R1 and S2 were directionally consistent than when they were
inconsistent, indicating a detrimental effect of R1 processing on
the perception of consistent S2 stimuli. As perceptual performance
with neutral R1 (responses that are neither consistent nor incon-
sistent with S2; e.g., double key presses) was found comparable
with performance on inconsistent trials, the effect can be regarded
as perceptual impairment by consistent responses (Mu¨sseler &
Wu¨hr, 2002; Oriet, Stevanovski, & Jolicœur, 2003).
In a contrasting set of motorvisual dual-task studies, R1 pro-
cessing facilitated S2 perception (e.g., Deubel, Schneider, & Pa-
protta, 1998; Hommel & Schneider, 2002; Mu¨sseler, Wu¨hr, Dan-
ielmeier, & Zysset, 2005; Paprotta, Deubel, & Schneider, 1999).
Deubel et al. (1998), for example, had participants point to one of
six different locations (R1), indicated by the color and orientation
of a centrally presented triangular cue (S1). In one of these six
locations, either the symbol “E” or “?” (S2) was presented very
briefly while the other five locations were filled with distractors.
S2 discrimination performance was better when the target location
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of the pointing movement (R1) matched the location of the target
stimulus (S2) than when these locations differed. Comparisons
with neutral trials (trials without R1) indicated that the effect is due
to a perceptual facilitation in R1–S2 consistent trials instead of an
impairment of S2 perception by R1 movements to inconsistent
locations.
Despite a substantial amount of empirical evidence for the
existence of action influences on perception, it is currently un-
known what determines the direction of such effects. Accordingly,
Schu¨tz-Bosbach and Prinz (2007) noted in their review of research
on motorvisual effects “that action production sometimes reduces
and at other times increases our perceptual sensitivity to similar
events in the environment. Indeed, this issue is so far poorly
understood and needs to be investigated further” (p. 351). The lack
of an integrative theory poses, for current research into motorvi-
sual effects, the apparent problem that effect direction cannot be
properly predicted. As Muthukumaraswamy and Johnson (2007)
noted in a related review, “[when] several lines of behavioral
evidence of this sort are considered, it can be seen that it is difficult
to know a priori whether facilitation or interference effects will be
observed in any particular paradigm” (p. 52).
Here, we propose a solution to the problem of contradictory
effect directions in motorvisual priming. The gist of our argument
is that motorvisual facilitation is due to movement control pro-
cesses, whereas motorvisual impairment is caused by action plan-
ning. Our suggestion is based on two observations. First, the
majority of motorvisual facilitation studies reported facilitation for
spatial R1–S2 consistency (e.g., Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz,
2007; Lindemann & Bekkering, 2009; Schiegg, Deubel, & Sch-
neider, 2003), whereas motorvisual impairment seems to be con-
fined to cases where R1–S2 consistency is defined on a categor-
ical, non-spatial level (e.g., Eder & Klauer, 2007; James &
Gauthier, 2009; Kunde & Wu¨hr, 2004). Second, recent findings
and theoretical developments in motor cognition research suggest
that action planning employs primarily categorical representations,
whereas movement control employs exclusively spatial represen-
tations (e.g., Glover, 2004b).
We assume that planning processes tightly bind representations
into stable action plans, preventing them from usage in other
concurrent cognitive processes, such as perception of action-
consistent stimuli. Thus, planning impairs concurrent perception.
Movement control processes, on the contrary, constantly require
highly accurate perceptions of spatial effector–target relations.
Thus, movement programming shifts attention to spatially action-
consistent areas in perceptual space. Hence, perceptual sensitivity
for spatially action consistent stimuli is improved due to move-
ment control demands. As a consequence, motorvisual interference
effects can be observed only for categorical R1–S2 consistency,
while spatial R1–S2 consistency gives rise to motorvisual facili-
tation. We refer to this set of assumptions as the planning and
control model (PCM) of motorvisual priming. Despite the restric-
tion of impairment to categorical and of facilitation to spatial R–S
overlap, the PCM makes further predictions about different char-
acteristics of motorvisual impairment and facilitation. According
to the PCM, impairment should be affected by action context and
should be sensitive to set-level compatibility between responses
and stimuli, whereas facilitation should be unaffected by these
factors. Evidence in support of both predictions has been obtained
in several empirical studies (Hommel & Mu¨sseler, 2006; Thom-
aschke, Hopkins, & Miall, 2011; Wykowska, Hommel, & Schubö,
2011).
We organize our argument for the PCM as follows. In the
subsequent section, we briefly review the previous empirical lit-
erature on impairment and facilitation effects in motorvisual dual-
tasks. Then we review previous evidence for the processing of
different representations in planning and control as well as for the
impact of planning and control processes on perception. After
specifying the PCM in more detail, we discuss its predictions and
show how these predictions have been met in the previous empir-
ical literature on motorvisual priming. Then we analyze the mod-
el’s explanatory power in the light of competitor models. We
conclude by discussing potential extensions of the model.
Motorvisual Impairment and Facilitation
Motorvisual effects have been shown in a large variety of
dual-tasks with different dimensions of overlap between R1 and
S2. First, we review studies where the overlap between R1 and S2
had detrimental effects on S2 perception—motorvisual impairment
studies. Then we turn to studies in which overlap between R1 and
S2 improved S2 perception—motorvisual facilitation studies.
Motorvisual Impairment
Motorvisual impairment has been found in dual-tasks with over-
lap dimensions such as linguistic similarity, valence congruency,
or symbolic meaning. On the linguistic level, Hommel and Mu¨s-
seler (2006, Experiment 3B) have shown a motorvisual impair-
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Figure 1. A motorvisual dual-task paradigm. In a primary task, partici-
pants respond with one response (R1) to one stimulus (S1). During plan-
ning or execution of R1, participants observe a second stimulus (S2). With
the second response (R2), participants report their perceptual judgment
about S2. The independent variable is typically the categorical or spatial
consistency between R1 and S2. The figures on the bottom illustrate
exemplary results for a typical motorvisual interference effect (perfor-
mance in consistent conditions is inferior to performance in inconsistent
conditions) and a typical motorvisual facilitation effect (performance in
consistent conditions is superior to performance in inconsistent condi-
tions).
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ment effect for verbal R1–S2 consistency. These authors asked
participants to speak out the word “left” (R1) in response to a left
pointing arrowhead (S1) and the word “right” in response to a right
pointing arrowhead. In a secondary task, participants had to iden-
tify a difficult to discriminate printed word “LEFT” or “RIGHT”
(S2) and to report their perceptual judgment by a later key press
(R2). S2 (the printed word) appeared shortly before, after, or
during the execution of R1 (speaking a word). S2 identification
rate was lower when R1 and S2 were consistent (e.g., speaking the
word “left” while observing the word “LEFT”) than when they
were inconsistent (e.g., speaking the word “right” while observing
the word “LEFT”). These results indicate that primary response
execution (R1  word speaking) selectively impaired the percep-
tion of consistent secondary stimuli (S2  printed words).
Besides word perception, the perception of word-consistent
colors can also be impaired by word speaking (Kunde & Wu¨hr,
2004, Experiment 3). In Kunde and Wu¨hr’s (2004) experiment,
participants had to read aloud (R1) visually presented color words
(S1) while identifying difficult to discriminate color patches (S2),
which were either consistent (e.g., reading the word “yellow” and
perceiving a yellow color patch) or inconsistent (e.g., reading the
word “green” while perceiving a red color patch) with R1. As in
Hommel and Mu¨sseler’s (2006, Experiment 3B) experiment, iden-
tification rates were higher for inconsistent R1–S2 pairings than
for consistent ones. On the single letter level, verbal motorvisual
consistency can also produce perceptual impairment. In a recent
study by James and Gauthier (2009), participants drew curved or
straight letters or shapes (R1) while they had to detect letters or
shapes (S2) embedded in noise, as a secondary task. Identification
of letters was impaired by concurrent motor performance, and the
impairment was particularly pronounced when the category (letter/
shape) and the form (straight/curvy) of R1 and S2 were consistent,
indicating symbol-specific motorvisual impairment.
Evidence for motorvisual impairment by valence consistency
comes from a study by Eder and Klauer (2007, Experiment 1). In
a primary task, participants pressed a left or a right button (R1) in
response to a visually presented strongly negative or positive word
cue (S1). The word cue was assumed to “charge” the responses
positively or negatively. In a secondary task, they reported the
valence of a difficult to discriminate visually presented adjective
(S2). In a further experiment (Eder & Klauer 2007, Experiment 2),
the primary task consisted of simultaneously speaking the word
“positive” (or “negative”) and pressing the left (or right) button
(R1) in response to visual letter cues (S1), whereas the secondary
task was, again, the discrimination of the valence of visually
displayed adjectives. In both experiments, the identification rate
for the adjectives’ valence was better when that valence was
inconsistent with the valence of the primary response (R1), sug-
gesting a detrimental effect from R1 processing on the perception
of valence-consistent stimuli (S2).
The majority of motorvisual impairment studies have, however,
examined effects from the processing of binary left/right response
codes on the perception of symbolically consistent stimuli (sym-
bols representing the binary category left/right). The most fre-
quently applied response–stimulus sets in this line of research are
left/right key presses and left/right pointing arrowheads. In a
seminal study by Mu¨sseler and Hommel (1997), participants made,
in a primary task, a non-speeded left or right key press (R1)
signaled by a left or right pointing arrowhead cue (S1). The
secondary task required the identification of a briefly presented
and masked arrowhead pointing to the left or to the right (S2).
When the categories of the primary response and secondary stim-
ulus were consistent (e.g., a left key press with a left pointing
arrowhead), secondary task correctness was lower than when they
were inconsistent (e.g., a left key press and a right pointing
arrowhead). Thus, execution of a binary choice reaction can impair
the perception of a concurrently displayed symbolically consistent
stimulus.
A recent study by Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schu¨tz-Bosbach,
and Waszak (2010) has shown that R1 can also impair S2 when the
categorical associations between response and stimulus have been
acquired only within the experiment. In a practice phase, partici-
pants generated a random sequence of left and right key presses.
The key presses were immediately followed by either a left or right
tilted Gabor patch. Left key presses always produced right-tilted
Gabor patches, and right key presses always produced left-tilted
patches, or the other way around. This association was counter-
balanced across participants. In a test phase, participants’ key
presses (R1) were followed by difficult to discriminate left-tilted,
right-tilted, or non-tilted Gabor patches (S2). In contrast to the
practice phase, combinations of R1 and tilt-direction were now
randomized. Participants were more accurate in detecting tilted S2
stimuli when the detection target (S2) had, in the practice phase,
been deterministically produced by the current R1. Hence, actions
specifically impair the perception of previously acquired visual
action effects (see also Pfister, Heinemann, et al., 2011).
Motorvisual Facilitation
Motorvisual facilitation effects have been observed when re-
sponses and stimuli overlapped with regard to location, size, or
orientation. A considerable number of studies have shown that
actions can facilitate perceptual processing at action consistent
locations. On the level of the left/right visual field, such effects
have been shown by three previous motorvisual priming studies
(Hommel & Schneider, 2002; Mu¨sseler, Koch, & Wu¨hr, 2005,
Experiment 1; Mu¨sseler, Wu¨hr, et al., 2005). For example, Mu¨s-
seler, Wu¨hr, et al. (2005, Experiment 2) had participants press a
left or a right key (R1) in response to a high or a low pitch tone
(S1). In a secondary task, participants had to report whether a
briefly displayed circle (S2) had horizontal or vertical gaps. The
circle was displayed either on the left or right side of the screen.
Identification performance in the secondary task was higher when
the location of the primary response (R1) and the location of the
secondary stimulus (S2) were consistent (e.g., right key press and
symbol in the right visual field) than when they were inconsistent
(e.g., right key press and symbol in the left visual field). Thus,
responses facilitated stimulus processing at response consistent
locations.
Motorvisual priming studies with pointing and grasping move-
ments as R1 (e.g., Baldauf & Deubel, 2009; Baldauf, Wolf, &
Deubel, 2006; Collins, Schicke, & Röder, 2008; Deubel et al.,
1998) have shown that more complex movements can focus spatial
attention in a more precise way to certain locations, rather than
merely favoring one half of the visual field (see also Humphreys et
al., 2005). In one of these studies (Deubel et al., 1998), participants
had to point (R1) in response to a central visual cue (S1) toward
one of 10 horizontally arranged positions. Secondary stimuli were
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displayed in positions that spatially corresponded to the pointing
targets. On each trial, a target appeared at one of the positions.
Participants had to report (R2) which of the targets they had seen.
Discrimination performance was higher when the R1 pointing
target matched the display location of S2, indicating a motorvisual
facilitation effect. An analogous facilitation effect has also been
observed for cyclically arranged response and stimulus locations
(Paprotta et al., 1999) and for grasping movements (Schiegg et al.,
2003). Schiegg et al. (2003) have shown that a two finger grasping
movement toward an object (R1) directs visual attention toward
the two parts of the object that are to be touched by the two fingers
(see Baldauf & Deubel, 2008, Experiment 1, for analogous results
concerning bimanual pointing).
Whereas the previously reviewed studies applied paradigms in
which the spatial consistency-dimension (visual field) was irrele-
vant to the secondary task (participants had to discriminate
symbol-identity, not location), Koch, Metin, and Schuch (2003,
Experiment 1) demonstrated that motorvisual location-priming
also takes place when location is the task-relevant stimulus dimen-
sion. In their study, participants pointed in response to tone pitch
(S1) from a home key toward two lateral response keys (R1) and
had to report whether a small masked dot moved from the center
quickly to the left or to the right side of the screen (S2). Consis-
tency between response target location (R1) and stimulus target
location (S2) yielded higher accuracy than R1–S2 location-
inconsistency.
Actions can also prime other spatial dimensions besides loca-
tion. Lindemann and Bekkering (2009, Experiment 3), for exam-
ple, have shown a motorvisual priming effect for orientation
consistency between R1 and S2. In a primary task, participants had
to manually rotate a cross-like object (R1) either in clockwise or in
counterclockwise direction. A secondary task required a speeded
foot pedal response (R2) to a visual go signal (S2). The go signal
consisted of a sudden tilt of a horizontal or vertical bar in either
clockwise or counterclockwise direction. Reaction times for R2
were shorter when the movement direction of R1 and the tilt
direction of S2 were consistent than when they were inconsistent,
indicating motorvisual facilitation for orientation consistency.
Miall et al. (2006) have shown a case of motorvisual facilitation
with a much higher degree of R1–S2 resemblance than the previ-
ously reviewed ones. These authors asked participants to execute
one of two cyclical hand movements (open/close a fist vs. alter-
nated pronation/supination) while monitoring a movie display of
the same or of the other one of the two movements on a computer
screen. The visual task was to respond verbally as soon as a
deviant orientation of any fingers (e.g., victory sign) was detected
within the monitored movement display (also see Stanley & Miall,
2009). When executed and observed movement were consistent
(i.e., the same hand movement), verbal RTs were faster than when
they were inconsistent—a motorvisual facilitation effect. Thus,
motorvisual facilitation effect for spatial orientation can also be
observed for complex displays of effector movements.
Some recent motorvisual facilitation studies have compared the
spatial attentional effects of different movement types with each
other, finding marked differences depending on the type of pri-
mary response with regard to the primed stimulus dimension. In a
study by Fagioli, Hommel, and Schubotz (2007), participants had
to either point to a location or to grasp and lift an object (R1) while
detecting either location or size deviations in an unrelated regular
visual stimulus movement (S2). Deviations in size (a spatial di-
mension relevant for grasping control) were better detected during
grasping movements, whereas deviations in location (a spatial
dimension relevant to pointing movements) were better detected
during pointing movements. Using a similar design, Wykowska,
Schubö, and Hommel (2009) found facilitation for the search of
luminance defined targets (S2) among distractors during pointing
movements (R1), whereas grasping facilitated visual performance
in the same task when the targets were defined by size. These
results show that actions can facilitate, besides visual processing in
certain areas on a spatial feature dimension (like left location or
small size), processing on an entire spatial stimulus dimension
such as location or size, when this dimension is particularly im-
portant for the control of the action.
Representations in Sensory-Motor Cognition
A basic assumption of the PCM is that action planning processes
primarily categorical representations and movement control pro-
cesses primarily spatial representations. Before reviewing evi-
dence for this assumption, we specify in more detail how we
distinguish between categorical and spatial representations and
between action planning and movement control.
Definitional Issues
There is converging evidence from behavioral and neuropsy-
chological research that cognitive processing makes use of two
fundamentally different kinds of mental representations (Kosslyn,
2006; Kosslyn, Thompson, Gitelman, & Alpert, 1998; Logan,
1995). One kind of representation is non-metric and relational. It is
used to represent stimuli and responses as members of categories.
Categories can be linguistic, semantic, symbolic, or spatial rela-
tional. We refer to these representations as categorical representa-
tions. Typical examples for categorical representations are repre-
sentations that code whether a certain response falls into a
response category in a binary choice task. Representations for
word identities, for the meaning of symbols, or for valence cate-
gories (positive/negative) are other examples.
The other kind of mental representation has metric properties
and codes exact spatial parameters of stimuli and responses. The
spatial parameters for which metric representations have been
empirically established are location, size, and orientation (Kosslyn,
1994). We refer to this kind of representation with spatial repre-
sentations. Please note that some categorical representations have
relational content that is sometimes referred to as “spatial” in a
non-metric sense. For example, a categorical semantic representa-
tion of the word “left” represents a meaning that refers to binary
categories like relative location or relative direction. However, we
would not regard this representation as spatial, as it does not
convey any metric information. Our usage of “spatial” is restricted
to metric representations of spatial information.
Another crucial distinction in our model is that between action
planning and movement control. Many traditional and current
theories of motor cognition distinguish between a planning com-
ponent and a control component of an action that each have
neurally and behaviorally distinct characteristics (see Elliott,
Helsen, & Chua, 2001, for a review). Action planning usually
refers to the process of selecting an appropriate action based on the
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current environmental situation and one’s motivational state. A
typical example of an action planning process is the selection of a
response, given a certain imperative stimulus in a choice reaction
task. Note that some authors differentiate action planning further
into a selection and a programming stage (e.g., Pashler, 1994;
Proctor & Dutta, 1995) where selection determines an abstract
“non-motoric” representation of an action category, and program-
ming translates this abstract representation into basic executable
motor-parameters. Others have argued that motor cognition can
better be understood by assuming a unified process encompassing
selection and programming (e.g., Hommel, 2009). Our model does
not rely on the distinction between selection and programming,
and is thus compatible with both views. For our argument, it is
only relevant that representations processed in action planning
specify the basic parameters for the movement required to achieve
the action goal. By basic parameters, we refer to the information
necessary to initiate the movement. For a grasping movement, for
example, planning would specify which object to grasp, whether a
full hand grip or a precision grip is required, and which effector is
most appropriate.
Once the basic movement parameters are chosen, movement
control sets in. Most current theories of motor cognition assume
that movement execution is accompanied by constant online mon-
itoring mechanisms, ensuring that the movement reaches its in-
tended goal (Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Wolpert &
Ghahramani, 2000; Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998). Motorvisual
feedback cycles are thought to constantly predict sensory conse-
quences of the current state of the motor system and to integrate
these predictions with actual sensory feedback and the intended
action goal to diminish mismatch between actual movement and
action goal. We refer to these monitoring processes with the term
movement control.
Categorical and Spatial Representations in Action
Planning and Movement Control
We assume that action planning processes primarily categorical
representations and that movement control processes primarily
spatial representations. This assumption has been supported by a
considerable amount of neuroscientific and behavioral evidence
(see Glover, 2004b, for a review).
With regard to action planning, research on stimulus–response
compatibility has shown that RTs are faster when stimuli and
responses overlap on a categorical dimension than when they do
not (see Proctor & Vu, 2006, for a review). When, for example, a
left-pointing arrowhead is mapped to a left key press, and a right
pointing arrowhead is mapped to a right key press, RTs are faster
than when the mapping is reversed (Wang & Proctor, 1996). Thus,
the action planning process is affected by categorical information
processing. Similar results have been found in studies with other
categorical overlap dimensions, such as stimulus intensity/
response force (Romaigue`re, Hasbroucq, Possamaı¨, & Seal, 1993)
and stimulus duration/response duration (Kunde & Stöcker, 2002).
Spatial representations (in the above defined sense) are not
processed in action planning. Although some earlier theories had
assumed that the precise spatial course of an action is preselected
in advance of its initiation (Keele, 1968), current accounts of
action cognition assume that metric spatial parameters are con-
trolled only during the course of the movement (Hommel, 2009;
Schmidt, 1975). The processing of certain features in movement
control is mostly studied with perturbation paradigms. In such
paradigms, certain features of the movement target are quickly
changed at or after movement onset (e.g., Prablanc & Pe´lisson,
1990). Fast corrections to perturbations of a certain target feature
indicate that representations of that feature are processed in move-
ment control (for reviews, see Desmurget, Pe´lisson, Rossetti, &
Prablanc, 1998; Proteau, Boivin, Linossier, & Abahnini, 2000).
There is extensive evidence for online corrections for perturbed
spatial features of movement targets, like location, size, and ori-
entation. Paulignan, Mackenzie, Marteniuk, and Jeannerod (1991),
for example, demonstrated quick reactions to online location per-
turbations. Others have shown that individuals can also compen-
sate well for online size perturbations (Castiello, Bennett, &
Chambers, 1998; Castiello, Bennett, & Stelmach, 1993; Glover,
Miall, & Rushworth, 2005; Paulignan, Jeannerod, Mackenzie, &
Marteniuk, 1991; van de Kamp, Bongers, & Zaal, 2009) until quite
late in the course of a movement (Hesse & Franz, 2009). Likewise,
an initially inappropriate hand orientation can be corrected to
match target orientation in late phases of a grasping movement
(Gosselin-Kessiby, Messier, & Kalaska, 2008), and perturbations
of target orientation are compensated for quickly (Desmurget &
Prablanc, 1997; Desmurget et al., 1996, 1995).
Several studies have explicitly investigated the different influ-
ence of categorical and spatial factors on action planning and
movement control. Glover and Dixon (2002b) have adapted a
paradigm by Gentilucci and Gangitano (1998) to investigate the
relative timing of categorical and spatial effects on movement.
Gentilucci and Gangitano found that the words “short” and “long”
printed on objects primed the initial movement kinematics of
grasping these objects in a direction as if the objects would have
really been placed at the distance indicated by the respective word
(for similar effects, see Bonfiglioli, Finocchiaro, Gesierich, Rosi-
tani, & Vescovi, 2009; Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, &
Gangitano, 2000; Scorolli, Borghi, & Glenberg, 2009). Impor-
tantly, in the present context, Glover and Dixon have shown that
the effects of categorical spatial priming on reaching in Gentilucci
and Gangitano’s paradigm are present at the beginning of the
reaching movement but constantly decline over the course of the
movement. This suggests that categorical representations of binary
spatial relations are not processed in movement control. Instead,
control processes compensated, during the course of the move-
ment, for the wrongly planned initial kinematics during the course
of the movement by processing metric spatial representations of
the true spatial object properties. Another line of research has shown
that categorical variables affect RT (a measure of action planning)
rather than spatial movement accuracy (a measure of movement
control). For example, influences from subsequent action require-
ments seem to be restricted to action planning but not affecting
movement control. Fleming, Klatzky, and Behrmann (2002) had
participants first reach to—and then either grasp, post, or lift—an
object. Different overarching action goals affected the RT of initial
reaches but not the reaching movements themselves. Moreover,
Liu, Chua, and Enns (2008) have shown that control seems to be
unaffected by verbal processing. Dual-task interference from a
secondary unrelated letter identification task on a pointing move-
ment was observed for RT but not for movement accuracy.
The involvement of different representations in planning and
control is also a basic assumption of a sensory-motor processing
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model by Glover (2002). In a review (Glover, 2004b), he mar-
shaled a substantial amount of evidence for the processing of
categorical representation in action planning and for the processing
of spatial representations in movement control. One of Glover’s
central concerns in developing his models was, however, to ex-
plain earlier empirical findings (Haffenden & Goodale, 1998;
Jackson & Shaw, 2000; van Donkelaar, 1999; van Doorn, van der
Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2007; Westwood, Chapman, & Roy, 2000)
showing that the visual illusory context of movement targets has
seemingly no effect on movement control (see, e.g., Glover &
Dixon, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a). These older empirical studies have,
since then, been heavily criticized (Danckert, Sharif, Haffenden,
Schiff, & Goodale, 2002; Franz, Scharnowski, & Gegenfurtner,
2005; Grierson & Elliott, 2009; Handlovsky, Hansen, Lee, &
Elliott, 2004; Meegan et al., 2004; Mendoza, Elliott, Meegan,
Lyons, & Welsh, 2006). Consequently, it is commonly assumed
now that movement control is not immune against visual illusions
(see Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008, for a review). Thus, one of the
main explanatory targets for Glover’s models needs no explanation
anymore, as it has been rejected by empirical means with further
developed experimental designs and measurements. This does,
however, not devalue his model as such, because there is solid
empirical evidence for different representations in planning and
control that has nothing to do with visual illusions (see Glover,
2004a, and above). Thus, we retain the basic assumption of Glov-
er’s model, namely that action planning processes categorical
representations, and movement control processes spatial represen-
tations.
The PCM of Motorvisual Priming
In the preceding subsections, we have argued that motor plan-
ning employs primarily categorical representations, whereas motor
control employs primarily spatial representations. Here, we pro-
pose that these assumptions, together with the different functions
that mental representations have in action planning and movement
control, explain why actions, on the one hand, impair the percep-
tion of categorical stimulus features but, on the other hand, facil-
itate the perception of spatial stimulus features.
Binding and Motorvisual Impairment
The function of action planning is to integrate information about
action goals, situational factors, and knowledge about one’s own
motor system into a consistent action plan. This integration can be
considered as binding representations of all relevant aspects of the
action together and stabilizing this binding so that other cognitive
processes cannot interfere with it before or during action initiation.
To achieve this stabilization, the binding of representations inhibits
their manipulation by other cognitive processes. Consequently,
representations that are bound in action plans are less accessible
for other cognitive processes such as visual perception. We do not
make any assumption about the specific physical realization of the
binding process for action plans. Several different neural binding
models could account for the binding of intermodal representations
in action plans (Hommel, 2004). Important for our model is only
that binding representations in an action plan implies limiting the
accessibility of these bound representations for other cognitive
processes. Others have described this phenomenon as “occupa-
tion” (e.g., Schubö, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) or “encapsula-
tion” (Mu¨sseler, 1999) of representations by action plans. It fol-
lows that when a particular non-spatial representation is currently
involved in an action planning process, concurrent visual percep-
tual processes have only limited access to this representation.
Consequently, perception of stimuli that possess the represented
feature is impaired. This assumption serves to explain the previ-
ously found motorvisual interference effects with categorical re-
sponse and stimulus features.
Attentional Focus and Motorvisual Facilitation
Spatial features are, however, not affected by this planning-
based motorvisual impairment phenomenon. This is due to their
function in movement control processes. Movement control con-
stantly processes representations of the spatial characteristics of
the action goal, the effector, and their spatial relation to each other
to reduce any potential mismatch between the predicted course of
the movement and momentary spatial target characteristics
(Diedrichsen, Shadmehr, & Ivry, 2010; Miall, 1998, 2003; Wolpert
et al., 1998). Whereas motor planning selects rather gross motor
parameters by relatively slow integration of a large variety of
contextual information, motor control consists in rapid fine tuning
of just the spatial properties of the action and target. This tuning
function requires a fast, precise, and fine-grained visual analysis of
the course of the movement and its target. Such an analysis greatly
benefits from an attentional focus on the action relevant regions in
representational space while ignoring others. Consequently, plan-
ning an action automatically shifts spatial attention to aspects that
are relevant to the planned action to facilitate consecutive control
processes. This shift of spatial attention takes place on two differ-
ent levels, on the feature level and on the dimension level. Plan-
ning, for example, to grasp a small object facilitates the processing
of size information in general (the dimension level), because it is
relevant for online adjustment of grip aperture. However, it also
facilitates visual processing of small objects in particular (the
feature level), because the quick perception of any changes in the
target object is essential for online control of the grasping move-
ment.
With regard to feature dimensions, planning a particular action
facilitates visual attention selectively for the spatial feature dimen-
sion that is relevant for controlling the resulting movement. Plan-
ning a grasping movement would, for example, facilitate informa-
tion processing on the spatial feature dimension “size” as well as
on the spatial feature dimension “orientation.” The control of other
actions, like pointing, does not require the prioritized processing of
size and orientation information. Consequently, processing of rep-
resentations on the feature dimensions “size” and “orientation” are
not facilitated by planning of a pointing action. The spatial feature
dimension “location” is required by the control of any hand move-
ment as long as it has a spatially defined goal, even if it is only
pressing down a certain key. Thus, hand movements in general—
key presses, pointing, or grasping—facilitate processing on the
spatial feature dimension “location,” whereas verbal articulatory
movements, on the other hand, do not facilitate visual location
processing.
We also propose that planning of different types of movement
facilitate processing on a particular feature dimension to different
degrees. Although planning of any hand movement facilitates
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processing of metric location representations, some movements
with a particularly high demand of location control (e.g., precise
pointing) facilitate location processing to a higher degree than
others do (e.g., a key press).
With regard to features—as opposed to feature dimensions—we
propose that planning a movement also shifts visual attention to
the relevant areas in representational space within a feature dimen-
sion. Planning a pointing movement, for example, facilitates not
only location processing in general but it also shifts visual atten-
tion to the region where the pointing movement is initially aiming
at. Control of pointing movements benefits not only from facili-
tated processing of location in general but also from facilitated
visual processing at particular locations. Likewise, planning a
grasp of a horizontally oriented bar facilitates the processing of
horizontally oriented objects. Planning to grasp a large object
facilitates the visual processing of objects that are large.
In summary, we propose that perception of categorically action-
consistent stimuli is impaired by binding of representations re-
quired in action plans, whereas perception of spatially action-
consistent stimuli is facilitated by an attentional focus on spatially
control-relevant stimuli and stimulus dimensions (for a schematic
of illustration of the model, see Figure 2).
Explanatory Power of the PCM
The main purpose of the PCM is to explain why some motor-
visual dual-tasks show impairment and others show facilitation
effects. In the subsequent subsections, we show that the PCM
would correctly predict the observed effect direction for each
reviewed motorvisual study. Moreover, the PCM gains further
plausibility from more specific predictions about motorvisual im-
pairment and facilitation, which have been confirmed by recent
empirical studies. The association of motorvisual impairment with
planning and of motorvisual facilitation with control implies that
some of the major differences between planning and control
should also be observable in motorvisual impairment and facilita-
tion. In particular, the PCM predicts that impairment should be
affected by set level compatibility between R1 and S2, and by
action context, whereas facilitation should not. The time window
of both effects should, however, be comparable. In the following
subsections, we discuss the individual predictions of the PCM, and
show how these predictions have been investigated empirically.
Categorical and Spatial Overlap
The PCM predicts that categorical overlap between R1 and S2
leads to motorvisual impairment. This prediction is, to our knowl-
edge, met by all previous dual-task studies that have shown mo-
torvisual impairment effects. The motorvisual impairment studies,
reviewed above, applied R1–S2 overlap with regard to words
(Hommel & Mu¨sseler, 2006), the valence of words (Eder &
Klauer, 2007, 2009), letters (James & Gauthier, 2009), colors
(Kunde & Wu¨hr, 2004), categorical action effects (Cardoso-Leite
et al., 2010), and binary left/right categories (Mu¨sseler & Hommel,
1997). These dimensions of overlap are all commonly regarded as
non-metric categorical.
For metric spatial overlap between R1 and S2, the PCM predicts
a motorvisual facilitation effect. In particular, we predict
dimension-wise facilitation effects when the congruency between
R1 and S2 is manipulated on the dimension level, and we predict
facilitation effects on the feature dimension when R1–S2 congru-
ency is manipulated on the feature level. To our knowledge, this
prediction is also met by all previous dual-task studies that have
reported a motorvisual facilitation effect either on the dimension or
on the feature level.
With regard to the dimension level, the planning of pointing
actions facilitates the visual processing of location information,
whereas planning a grasping action facilitates visual processing of
size information (Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007; Wykowska
et al., 2009). With regard to the feature level, lateral hand or finger
movements have been shown to facilitate visual processing in the
ipsilateral visual field (Hommel & Schneider, 2002; Mu¨sseler,
Koch, & Wu¨hr, 2005, Experiment 1; Mu¨sseler, Wu¨hr, et al., 2005),
whereas pointing or grasping movements facilitate visual process-
ing in target compatible locations (Deubel et al., 1998; Linnell,
Humphreys, McIntyre, Laitinen, & Wing, 2005). The same has
been shown for the metric spatial dimensions “size” and “orien-
tation.” Planning a grasping movement to a small or a large object
automatically shifts attention toward size consistent objects (e.g.,
grasping a small object facilitates perceptual processing of any
small objects; see Symes, Ottoboni, Tucker, Ellis, & Tessari, 2010;
Symes, Tucker, Ellis, Vainio, & Ottoboni, 2008). Likewise, grasp-
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Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the planning and control model
(PCM). Motor planning binds categorical representations of the action
features (solid line between “category left” and “valence positive”) so that
potential connections to other cognitive processes, such as perception, are
inhibited. Motor control activates spatial representations of the action so
that their potential connections to other cognitive processes, such as per-
ception, are facilitated in general. This has the effect that, during motor
processing, the perceptual processing of categorically action consistent
stimuli is impaired, whereas the perceptual processing of spatially action
consistent stimuli is facilitated.
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ing movements facilitate the processing of orientation consistent
objects (Lindemann & Bekkering, 2009).
Note, however, that in the majority of interference studies,
R1–S2 overlap was manipulated on a S2 dimension that was task
relevant, whereas in the majority of facilitation studies, overlap
was manipulated on a task irrelevant S2 dimension. One might
argue against the PCM, that it is rather the relevance of S2 features
that is crucial in determining whether S2 perception is facilitated
or impaired by compatible R1. Task relevance of stimuli has been
shown to strongly affect the coding of stimulus features in spatial
or in a verbal mode (Miles & Proctor, 2011). This alternative to the
PCM could, however, be rejected on two counts. First, Pfister,
Heinemann, et al. (2011) showed that S2 detection can be impaired
by compatible R1 when R1–S2 overlap is irrelevant to the detec-
tion task. Participants were better in detecting S2 that have been
R1 effects in a previous training phase, although S2 identity was
irrelevant to S2 detection in the test phase (see also Cardoso-Leite
et al., 2010). Second, for motorvisual facilitation, a study by Koch
et al. (2003) revealed that R1 can facilitate S2 perception for S2
features that are task relevant. Location identification of a laterally
presented dot was improved when R1 key presses were ipsilateral
relative to when they were contralateral.
Moreover, the predictions of the PCM concerning facilitation
and interference have also been confirmed by a recent comparative
EEG study (Press, Gherri, Heyes, & Eimer, 2010), where re-
sponses were compatible to stimuli on a categorial and on a spatial
dimension, and where both dimensions were task irrelevant. Par-
ticipants observed displays of finger movements while executing
their own finger movements. Visual event-related brain potentials
were decreased when movement categories were compatible (e.g.,
both finger taps) relative to when they were incompatible (e.g., a
finger tap and a finger lift). When observed and executed move-
ments were compatible on a spatial dimension (i.e., at correspond-
ing locations), visual brain potentials were increased relative to
when they were incompatible (i.e., at different locations; also see
Gherri & Eimer, 2010).
Thus, the PCM model can reconcile the frequently recognized
(e.g., Mu¨sseler, 1999; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2007), but
previously unresolved (Schu¨tz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007), contrast
concerning effect directions in previous motorvisual priming re-
search.
Categorical Representations of Spatial Relations
Among the most puzzling findings in previous motorvisual
priming research were some sets of studies with R1–S2 overlap on,
seemingly, the same dimension but with opposing effects direc-
tions. For example, lateral key presses impaired compatible arrow-
heads in one set of studies (e.g., a left key press impaired a left
pointing arrowhead; Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997; Oriet, Ste-
vanovski, & Jolicœur, 2007). However, in another set of studies,
with nearly identical experimental designs, lateral key presses
facilitated perception of stimuli in the compatible visual field (e.g.,
a left key press facilitated stimuli on the left; Hommel & Sch-
neider, 2002; Koch et al., 2003, Experiment 1; Mu¨sseler, Koch, &
Wu¨hr, 2005, Experiment 1; Mu¨sseler, Wu¨hr, et al., 2005, Exper-
iment 2). On first sight, both types of studies applied a R1–S2
overlap that is in the widest sense “locational.” However, a closer
look at the involved representations shows that there is a crucial
difference between both types of experiments.
In the one type of studies, the overlap is with regard to cate-
gorical representations of “location.” The categorical representa-
tion of a left key press (representing it as an element of a binary
response class) overlaps with the categorical representation of an
arrowhead symbolizing left location or direction. According to the
PCM, the category for “left” is bound into an action plan and is,
thus, less available for the perception of a categorically compatible
stimulus. Consequently, an impairment effect is observed from
lateral key presses on the perception of compatible arrowheads
(Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997; Mu¨sseler, Wu¨hr, & Prinz, 2000;
Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolicœur, 2002).
In the other type of studies, the overlap is, however, on a metric
dimension. A key press has, as a hand movement, also a metric
representation of its spatial location. When this location is to the
left of the body midline, visual processing in locationally overlap-
ping visual areas (i.e., the left visual field) should, according to the
PCM, be facilitated. Consequently, motorvisual facilitation is ob-
served when R1 and S2 overlap in location in a metric spatial
sense, as is the case with lateral key presses and lateral stimulus
presentations (Hommel & Schneider, 2002; Koch et al., 2003,
Experiment 1; Mu¨sseler, Koch, & Wu¨hr, 2005, Experiment 1;
Mu¨sseler, Wu¨hr, et al., 2005, Experiment 2).
An analogous contrast between opposing effect directions with
seemingly the same overlap dimension has been found for the
spatial overlap dimension “orientation.” In a study by Cardoso-
Leite et al. (2010), participants learned that one of two key presses
was deterministically followed by a Gabor patch tilted in clock-
wise direction and that the other key press was deterministically
followed by a Gabor patch in counterclockwise direction. In a
consecutive test phase, they had to detect whether patches were
tilted in a certain direction while again executing the two key
presses. Orientations were now randomly paired with key presses.
In the test phase, key presses selectively impaired the perception of
patches with the orientation that the key press had deterministi-
cally produced in the learning phase. Thus, key presses impaired
orientation compatible stimuli. However, in a study by Lindemann
and Bekkering (2009, Experiment 3), grasping movements facili-
tated the perception of bars in grasping-compatible orientations
relative to bars with grasping incompatible orientations.
Again, differentiation between the different types of “orienta-
tion” representations resolves the contrast in effect direction. In the
study by Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010), the overlap between R1 and
S2 was on a categorical representational dimension. During the
acquisition phase, key presses affected the tilt of the patches in a
binary categorical fashion. Response category determined which
of two alternative tilts was observed. Any potential metric prop-
erties of the key presses were unrelated to the orientation of the
patches. Thus, binary orientation categories were associated with
the key presses. Action planning also involves the processing of
learned action effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Kiesel & Hoff-
mann, 2004; Kunde, 2001; Pfister, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2011;
Pfister, Kiesel, & Melcher, 2010; see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi,
2010, for a review). Thus, in the test phase of Cardoso-Leite et
al.’s study, categorical representations of the patches’ orientations
were bound into the action plans for the key press. This impaired,
according to the PCM, processing of stimuli with compatible
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orientation categories, leading to the observed motorvisual impair-
ment effect.
In the study by Lindemann and Bekkering (2009), R1–S2 over-
lap was with regard to metric representations of orientation. R1
were grasping movements. The control of grasping movements, in
contrast to the control of key presses, requires the processing of
metric orientation information. Thus, according to the PCM, plan-
ning a grasping movement facilitates visual processing of metric
representations of orientation in general and, in addition, visual
processing of metric representations of grasp-compatible orienta-
tions in particular. Consequently, the perception of grasping com-
patible stimuli was facilitated in Lindemann and Bekkering’s
study.
These examples demonstrate the importance of precisely distin-
guishing between categorical and metric representation to explain
motorvisual priming phenomena. This distinction is one of the key
features of the PCM. As previous models of motorvisual priming
did not make this distinction, they were not able to explain con-
trasting effect directions between sets of studies that differ only in
the type of representational overlap (binary categorical vs. metric
spatial) on seemingly the same feature dimension.
Set Level Compatibility in Impairment and
Facilitation
Set level compatibility is the degree to which a stimulus set and
a response set are physically or conceptually similar (Fitts &
Deininger, 1954; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Proctor
& Vu, 2006). For example, responding with the words “left” or
“right” to a left or to a right arrowhead has a relatively lower set
level compatibility than responding with the words “left” or
“right” to the written words “left” and “right.” Set level compat-
ibility is to be distinguished from element level compatibility,
which refers to the compatibility of the mapping between elements
of a stimulus and a response set. Mapping the response-word “left”
to the stimulus-word “left” and the response word “right” to the
stimulus word “right” is compatible on the element level, whereas
the reverse mapping is incompatible. Note that at least some set
level compatibility is a precondition for element-level compatibil-
ity. An increase of set level compatibly typically leads to better
response performance (Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Kornblum et al.,
1990). The effect of set level compatibility on performance is
commonly thought to be located at the response selection stage
(see, e.g., Lien & Proctor, 2002; Wang & Proctor, 1996).
Response selection is part of what we refer to with “action
planning” in our model. Consequently, the PCM would predict that
motorvisual impairment is affected by set level compatibly. When
feature dimensions overlap to a higher degree between R1 and S2,
a stronger motorvisual impairment effect should be observed. With
higher set level compatibility, more features would overlap in
the case of element compatible R1–S2 pairing. Consequently,
more features needed to form a S2 percept would be bound in the
concurrent action plan, and the perceptual impairment would be
more severe.
The motorvisual facilitation effect should not, according to the
PCM, be affected by set level compatibility. The facilitation effect
is not dependent on mechanisms of response selection or feature
binding. Its function is movement control, and shifting attention to
spatially movement compatible regions in perceptual space sup-
ports control, independent of how exact is the match between
stimulus and response. A hand movement, for example, should
always facilitate location processing, no matter which other di-
mensions overlap between action and stimulus (e.g., orientation or
categorical dimensions, such as color). Likewise, grasping move-
ments should facilitate size processing to the same degree for
stimuli that match with the grasping movement with regard to
color or orientation. This is because variation of the color or
orientation does not diminish the facilitation’s functional relevance
for movement control. Size processing is always important for
grasping (to adjust grip aperture), independent of whether the
orientation (which is also automatically facilitated) requires more
or less online correction.
The PCM’s prediction that set level compatibility affects mo-
torvisual impairment, but not control, has been explicitly tested in
several studies. In different experiments, Hommel and Mu¨sseler
(2006) tested combinations of two response sets and two stimulus
sets with different degrees of set level compatibility. R1 sets were
speaking the words “left” or “right” and pressing a left or a right
key. S2 sets were the written words “left” or “right” and a left or
a right pointing arrowhead. The combination between spoken and
written words, as well as the combination between arrowheads and
key presses, has relatively high set level compatibility, whereas the
other combinations have relatively low set level compatibility
(Proctor & Wang, 1997). Within each experiment, element-
compatibility between R1 and S2 was manipulated trial-wise. In
experiments with high set level compatibility, the expected mo-
torvisual impairment effect for element-level compatible trials was
found, whereas no such effect was observed in experiments with
relatively low set level compatibility (Hommel & Mu¨sseler, 2006).
These results show that set level compatibility affects motorvisual
impairment, as predicted by the PCM. Note, however, that element
level compatibility effects are usually also present in single tasks
with low set level compatibility, only with a smaller magnitude
relative to high set level compatibility (Proctor & Wang, 1997).
The reason for the absence of significant impairment effects for
R1–S2 pairing with low set level compatibility (Hommel & Mu¨s-
seler, 2006) is probably the generally lower effect size of motor-
visual dual-task effects compared to visuomotor single task effects
and, consequently, a lower statistical power in the former type of
studies (Ward, 2002). A high degree of set level compatibility
might be a precondition for motorvisual impairment effects to
occur. Note, however, that R1–R2 impairment in dual-tasks has
also been observed for low set level compatibility (i.e., different
modalities; Fournier et al., 2010).
Wykowska, Hommel, and Schubö (2011) have investigated the
effects of set level compatibility on motorvisual facilitation. Par-
ticipants had to plan either a pointing or a grasping movement
while detecting a size-oddball target. According to the predictions
of the PCM, perceptual performance during planning a grasping
movement was superior to performance during planning a pointing
movement, because planning a grasping movement automatically
facilitates visual processing of size information (see above; also
see Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007; Wykowska et al., 2009).
Set level compatibility has also been manipulated between exper-
iments. In one experiment, the grasping targets (paper cups on
boards) were cyclically arranged, as the visual targets were. This
yielded a high set level compatibility between R1 (grasp) and S2
(size defined visual target). In another experiment, grasping targets
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were arranged in a horizontal line, whereas visual detection targets
were still arranged cyclically, yielding a relatively low set level
compatibility between R1 and S2. No effect of the set level
compatibility on the motorvisual facilitation effect was observed,
confirming the PCM’s prediction that the motorvisual facilitation
effect is independent of set level compatibility.
Action Context in Motorvisual Impairment and
Facilitation
An obvious difference between action planning and movement
control is the role of context in both processes, which should
according to the PCM be reflected in an analogous difference
between motorvisual impairment and facilitation. Context is es-
sentially involved in action planning, whereas movement control is
relatively independent from context. The function of action plan-
ning is to initiate the most appropriate movement pattern for
reaching a given action goal. Which action is most appropriate to
achieve a certain goal in a particular situation is highly dependent
on context. Thus, the processing of contextual information plays a
major role in action planning. Accordingly, substantial numbers of
studies have shown direct influences of contextual aspects on
action planning processes. For example, the already discussed
effects from verbal semantic processing on movement RTs (e.g.,
Bartolo, Weisbecker, & Coello, 2007; Lindemann, Stenneken, van
Schie, & Bekkering, 2006) and initial movement parameters (Gen-
tilucci et al., 2000; Glover & Dixon, 2002b; Scorolli et al., 2009)
can be seen as evidence for the effects of actually task-irrelevant
verbal context on action planning.
Control processes are, on the contrary, relatively immune to
contextual influences. The context-independence of control is due
to its strong attentional focus on spatially movement consistent
stimuli. The function of control is to quickly process motorvisual
feedback signals to launch rapid online corrections for potential
spatial movement–goal mismatches. Thus, processing speed is an
important aspect of control (see, e.g., van de Kamp et al., 2009)
that demands attentional focus but practically precludes the inte-
gration of any substantial amount of non-essential contextual in-
formation (except focused and spatial information).
The PCM’s prediction—that motorvisual impairment is suscep-
tible to contextual factors, whereas motorvisual facilitation is
not—is in accordance with the previous literature and has directly
been tested in a recent comparative study (Thomaschke et al.,
2011; also see below). Previous motorvisual priming studies have
clearly shown that motorvisual impairment can indeed be modu-
lated by contextual influences. In a motorvisual impairment ex-
periment by Eder and Klauer (2009), for example, ventral or dorsal
manual lever-movements (R1) were, for one participant group,
instructed as “away” (negative valence) from the body or “toward”
(positive valence) the body. For the other group of participants, the
same movements were described as “up” (positive valence) or
“down” (negative valence). The secondary task required the iden-
tification of adjectives (S2) with positive or negative valence. Eder
and Klauer found a motorvisual impairment effect from R1 pro-
cessing on S2 perception. This effect was, however, strongly
modulated by the different R1 instructions for both participant
groups. When the dorsal lever movement was described as “to-
ward” the body, it impaired selectively the perception of adjectives
with positive valence. When the same movement was described as
“down,” it selectively impaired adjectives with negative valence.
The same contrast was observed for ventral movements, suggest-
ing that response context strongly influences the motorvisual im-
pairment effect. For the motorvisual facilitation effect, such con-
textual modulations by instruction manipulation have not been
investigated.
Another important aspect of action context, despite action va-
lence, is the action trigger (S1) and its congruence to R1. Whether
an action is cued by a congruent stimulus or by an incongruent one
has major effects on the processing of that action, as evidenced by
slower and more error prone reactions for incongruent S–R map-
pings compared to congruent ones (Donders, 1868; Fitts & Dein-
inger, 1954; Proctor & Vu, 2006). These effects are commonly
thought to be due to action planning instead of movement control
(see above; also see Proctor & Vu, 2006). Thus, the PCM would
predict that S1–R1 congruency should affect the motorvisual im-
pairment effect but not the motorvisual facilitation effect. This
prediction has previously been confirmed for motorvisual impair-
ment by Wu¨hr and Mu¨sseler (2002). In a primary task, participants
had to react with left or right button presses (R1) to high or low
tones (S1). One group of participants had to respond with a left key
press to the low tone and with a right key press to the high tone,
whereas the mapping was reversed for the other group. Low tones
correspond to the spatial category “left,” whereas the higher of two
tones corresponds with the category “right” (see Deutsch,
Hamaoui, & Henthorn, 2007; Lidji, Kolinsky, Lochy, & Morais,
2007; Nishimura & Yokosawa, 2009; Rusconi, Kwan, Giordano,
Umilta`, & Butterworth, 2006; Wu¨hr & Mu¨sseler, 2002, Experi-
ment 3). Thus, the low-left/high-right mapping can be regarded as
congruent on a categorical level, and the low-right/high-left map-
ping can be regarded as incongruent. In a secondary task, partic-
ipants had to report the direction of R1-consistent or R1-
inconsistent arrowhead stimuli (S2). However, as cue-context
affects response planning and, according to the PCM, planning
processes underlie the motorvisual impairment of action-consistent
perceptions, one should expect that congruence versus incongru-
ence of S1–R1 mapping would strongly modulate the motorvisual
impairment effect for R1–S2 consistency. That is indeed what
Wu¨hr and Mu¨sseler (2002) observed. For participants with con-
gruent S1–R1 mapping, a substantial motorvisual impairment ef-
fect from R1 processing on consistent S2 stimuli was found. The
group of participants with incongruent S1–R1 mapping did not, on
the contrary, show any effects from R1 processing on S2 identi-
fication. These results confirm the PCM’s prediction that contex-
tual modulations affect the motorvisual impairment effect.
In a recent extension of Wu¨hr and Mu¨sseler’s (2002) study, we
directly compared the modulation from S1–R1 congruency on
motorvisual impairment with categorical R1–S2 consistency, and
on motorvisual facilitation for spatial R1–S2 consistency (Thom-
aschke et al., 2011). With regard to motorvisual impairment, we
replicated Wu¨hr and Mu¨sseler’s findings: motorvisual impairment
with congruent S1–R1 mapping, and no impairment effect with
incongruent S1–R1 mapping. With regard to motorvisual facilita-
tion, we substituted horizontal or vertical symbols in left or right
locations for the left or right pointing arrowheads as S2 stimulus
set. Thus, the R1–S2 compatibility was on a spatial (location)
dimension now, suggesting a motorvisual facilitation effect (see
Mu¨sseler, Wu¨hr, et al., 2005). Indeed, we found a facilitation
effect, and, importantly for the present argument, the facilitation
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effect was not modulated by S1–R1 mapping context. We ob-
served a substantial motorvisual facilitation effect with congruent
S1–R1 mapping as well as with incongruent S1–R1 mapping.
These findings confirmed the PCM’s prediction that action context
affects motorvisual impairment but not motorvisual facilitation.
The Time Course of Motorvisual Interference
and Facilitation
The PCM claims that the cognitive functions of the motorvisual
impairment and the motorvisual facilitation effect are quite differ-
ent. The function of the impairment effect is to stabilize action
plans by preventing cognitive interference with features bound into
the action plan. The function of motorvisual facilitation is to
support movement control by attentional focus. Despite their dif-
ferent functions, both effects are, according to the PCM, caused by
the same process: action planning. Action planning binds categor-
ical representations, causing the impairment effect, but also shifts
attention to movement relevant areas in representational space.
Consequently, the PCM predicts that motorvisual impairment and
facilitation can be observed on about the same time scale. Both
effects should emerge during the planning process of an action,
irrespective of when the action is initiated.
Action plans are stabilized throughout the course of an action to
prevent interference from other cognitive processes—unless the
action goal changes and the action plan needs to be updated. Thus,
representations bound in an action plan should be unavailable for
perception during the whole course of the action, producing a
motorvisual interference effect from the beginning of the planning
process until the action has been executed and the representations
are unbound again.
Likewise, motorvisual facilitation should start with the action
planning process, because an action plan is usually followed by a
movement and, hence, by control demands. Movement control
lasts until the action goal is reached. Thus, motorvisual facilitation
should also be present throughout the entire movement.
These predictions are in line with previous evidence. Motorvi-
sual interference has been observed from 2,000 ms before a Go-
signal for R1 (Hommel & Mu¨sseler, 2006; Wu¨hr & Mu¨sseler,
2001) until 1,000 ms after a R1 Go-signal (Cardoso-Leite et al.,
2010; Oriet, Stevanovski, & Jolicœur, 2003; Oriet et al., 2007;
Oriet, Stevanovski, Jolicœur, & Cowan, 2003). Motorvisual facil-
itation has also been shown to be present long before action
initiation (see Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007; Wykowska et
al., 2009). In the previously discussed study by Fagioli, Hommel,
and Schubotz (2007), for example, the detection of size-deviation
was already facilitated by planning a grasping and lifting action,
whereas the detection of location-deviation was already facilitated
by planning a pointing movement. Fagioli, Ferlazzo, and Hommel
(2007) have shown that it is not necessary that an action plan is
executed at all for the motorvisual facilitation effect to occur. Even
passively watching a pointing or lifting action from videotape
facilitates the corresponding perceptual dimension. Thus, process-
ing of very abstract representations of an action plan seems to be
sufficient to trigger dimension specific perceptual facilitation. Fur-
thermore, a recent comparative study has shown that within the
same paradigm, motorvisual impairment for categorically action-
compatible stimuli and motorvisual facilitation for spatially action-
compatible stimuli occur during nearly the same time window
(Thomaschke et al., 2011).
The PCM and Other Models of Motorvisual Priming
Several models have previously been put forward to explain
motorvisual priming effects (see Mu¨sseler, 1999; Schneider,
1995). Most of them differ from the PCM in that they do not
attempt to explain the contrast of effect directions found in mo-
torvisual priming, but rather they focus on either motorvisual
impairment (Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004) or on facilitation
(Baldauf & Deubel, 2010; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umilta`,
1987; Schneider, 1995). Other models attempted to reconcile dif-
ferent kinds of effects from action on perceptual processes; how-
ever, these effects were not qualitative perceptual impairment or
qualitative perceptual facilitation but were other motor-induced
changes in vision. Zwickel and Prinz’s (2011) model, for example,
reconciles assimilation bias and contrast bias from actions on
perceptual judgments of illusory motion, whereas a model by
Christensen, Ilg, and Giese (2011) explains different interactions
between actions and concurrent biological motion perception (also
see Grosjean, Zwickel, & Prinz, 2009; Stanley, Gowen, & Miall,
2007; and the later subsection on motorvisual bias). A related
model by Press et al. (2010) explains different effects from action
on perceptual EEG signals. Still others explain motorvisual im-
pairment and facilitation in an integrative manner (e.g., Hommel,
2009; Mu¨sseler, 1999; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2007),
but they cannot explain the full range of motorvisual priming
effects covered by the PCM. Thus, the PCM is, to our knowledge,
the only model to date that can explain the results of the entire
motorvisual dual-task priming studies reviewed above. However,
the PCM has not been developed from scratch but instead builds
up on several elements from previous motorvisual models. In the
following subsections, we discuss which elements have been ad-
opted from previous models but also how the PCM differs from
and goes beyond those models.
The most important building block of the PCM is the theory of
event coding (TEC; Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz,
2001). The basic claim of the TEC is that perceptual representa-
tions of action effects are processed in action planning. This claim
is also implicitly assumed by the PCM, because it explains why
actions can affect perception at all. However, two more specific,
TEC-inspired hypotheses have been integrated and modified in the
PCM to explain the effect directions in motorvisual priming—
namely the code occupation hypothesis and the attentional weight-
ing hypothesis (see the following subsections).
However, the most important claims of the PCM—the associa-
tion of impairment with planning and categorical representations,
and the association of facilitation with movement control and
spatial representations—have not been included in any previous
model. Thus, this distinction can be seen as the crucial novelty of
our model, and it is also the source of the model’s advantage in
explanatory power over previous models (see the Explanatory
Power of the PCM section).
The Code Occupation Hypothesis
The first part of our proposal—the claim that action planning
binds representations and thereby impairs perception of action
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consistent stimuli—has been previously put forward by others
(see, e.g., Eder & Klauer, 2007; Hamilton et al., 2004; Mu¨sseler &
Hommel, 1997; Mu¨sseler & Wu¨hr, 2002; Schubö, Prinz, & As-
chersleben, 2004) to account for motorvisual priming and related
phenomena (Eder, Mu¨sseler, & Hommel, 2012; Mattson &
Fournier, 2008; Stoet & Hommel, 1999). This assumption is com-
monly referred to as the code occupation hypothesis (see Wiediger
& Fournier, 2008, for a discussion). Most proponents of this
hypothesis have not, however, distinguished between categorical
and spatial representations in action and perception and have
instead assumed explicitly or implicitly that the code occupation
hypothesis applies to all kinds of action relevant visual represen-
tations. The main difference between the PCM and previous mod-
els incorporating the code occupation hypothesis is that we assume
code occupation to be effective only for categorical representa-
tions, because action planning primarily processes categorical rep-
resentations. Similar restrictions have been made by two studies in
the area of motorvisual judgment bias (Zwickel, Grosjean, &
Prinz, 2010) and motor-motor interference (Wiediger & Fournier,
2008). Zwickel et al. (2010) developed a “categorical account” of
motorvisual contrast to explain why an effect from hand move-
ments on perceptual bias was not increased when action and
perception were matched closer with respect to a metric location
scale. The categorical account claims that code occupation affects
only categorical representations of visual stimuli. Consequently,
effects from action on perception are restricted to categorical
overlap. This restriction of code occupation to categorical repre-
sentation can also be found in the PCM. However, in contrast to us,
Zwickel et al. suggested that the direction of a motorvisual effect
is determined by the ambiguity of S1 instead of the categorical/
spatial nature of R1–S2 consistency.
Wiediger and Fournier (2008) also made a suggestion to restrict
the code occupation hypothesis. They proposed that action plan-
ning, and thus code occupation, involves only “meaning based
representations” (p. 1146), which they define in opposition to
metric spatial representations. Based on this assumption, they
predicted that actions that do not require planning (e.g., visually
guided actions) are not affected by code occupation. This predic-
tion would be fully compatible with the PCM. It has, however, not
been applied to motorvisual effects by Wiediger and Fournier.
The Attentional Weighting Hypothesis
The attentional weighting hypothesis was first put forward by
Fagioli, Hommel, and Schubotz (2007) and has been developed
further by Wykowska and colleagues (Wykowska, Hommel, &
Schubö, 2011; Wykowska et al., 2009). It claims that action
planning facilitates perceptual processing on action relevant fea-
ture dimensions. This assumption is also made by the PCM. Like
in the PCM, the facilitation of action relevant stimulus dimensions
is functionally associated with movement control but is triggered
by action planning. A further commonality is that the attentional
weighting hypothesis distinguishes between representations that
are subject to motorvisual facilitation and representations that are
not (Hommel, 2009). Some features are specified already during
action planning, whereas other features need to be specified only
during online movement control. Only feature dimensions for the
latter kind of features are facilitated (Hommel, 2009, 2010). This
distinction clearly inspired the PCM. There are, however, two
crucial differences between the current formulation of the atten-
tional weighting hypothesis and the PCM. First, the attentional
weighting hypothesis does not distinguish between categorical and
spatial features, whereas the PCM claims that only the latter kind
of features are subject to motorvisual facilitation. Second, the
attentional weighting hypothesis restricts motorvisual facilitation
effects to whole feature dimensions, whereas the PCM claims that
motorvisual facilitation simultaneously takes place for dimensions
and for action-compatible regions within these dimensions. Con-
sequently, the PCM can also explain the previously reported mo-
torvisual facilitation effects on the feature level (Deubel et al.,
1998; Lindemann & Bekkering, 2009; Linnell et al., 2005).
Facilitation of Spatial Features
Two previous models, the visual attention model (Schneider,
1995) and the premotor view of attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1987),
have postulated that action planning facilitates perceptual process-
ing at action compatible locations. Both models were initially
developed to explain the attentional effects of saccades (Deubel &
Schneider, 1996; Umilta`, Mucignat, Riggio, Barbieri, & Rizzolatti,
1994) but have later been developed also to account for attentional
effects of manual movements (Craighero, Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzo-
latti, 2002; Gherri & Eimer, 2010; Schiegg et al., 2003) and for
spatial dimensions other than location, such as orientation (Craigh-
ero et al., 2002; Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta`, 1999). In
this respect, these models are similar to the PCM. They cannot,
however, explain any detrimental effects from action on perception
and, thus, do not account for the numerous dual-task studies
showing motorvisual impairment effects (e.g., Eder & Klauer,
2007; James & Gauthier, 2009; Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997).
Thus, despite incorporating some elements of previous models,
the PCM is, to our knowledge, the only model to account for the
entire range of motorvisual dual-task studies reviewed above.
Extending the Scope of the PCM
Action–perception influences have received considerable re-
search interest with a variety of research paradigms in areas such
as neurosciences (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009;
Serino et al., 2010), robotics (Metta, Sandini, Natale, Craighero, &
Fadiga, 2006; Riva, Gaggioli, & Mantovani, 2008; Wykowska,
Maldonado, Beetz, & Schubö, 2011), and social cognition (Gold-
man & de Vignemont, 2009; Grafton, 2009). The PCM could, in
principle, produce directional predictions for any potential motor-
visual effect, given that it is possible to distinguish spatial and
categorical consistencies between motor-activity and visual stim-
ulation. The focus in the present article has, however, been on
motorvisual dual-tasks, because they provide the most direct evi-
dence for influences from motor processing on perception, and
because the dual-task paradigm is extensively applied in behav-
ioral research on these influences. In the following subsections, we
discuss potential extensions of the PCM to other motorvisual
paradigms. We limit the discussion to three of the currently most
intensely researched motorvisual paradigms: human movement
perception, motorvisual judgment bias, and motorvisual single
tasks.
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Action Effects on the Perception of Biological Stimuli
Human perception of conspecifics is currently subject to intense
empirical investigation and controversial theorizing (Aleong &
Paus, 2010; Giese, Thornton, & Edelman, 2008; Pinto & Shiffrar,
2009). Perception of human motion seems to be in many respects
different from the perception of other stimuli (Blake & Shiffrar,
2007; Loula, Prasad, Harber, & Shiffrar, 2005). One peculiarity of
action–perception, which is particularly important for the present
issue, is its intimate relation to motor processing. Several recent
studies have shown that action–perception automatically activates
the motor system in a way similar to the activation when perform-
ing the observed action (Agnew, Bhakoo, & Puri, 2007; Buccino
et al., 2001; Catmur & Heyes, 2011). This covert activation is
specific to the muscles that would produce the observed action
(Alaerts, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009; Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda,
Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2002; Borroni, Montagna, Cerri, &
Baldissera, 2005; Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005; Fadiga,
Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995) and to the action’s temporal
structure (Baldissera, Cavallari, Craighero, & Fadiga, 2001; Gan-
gitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2001, 2004).
Such covert muscle activation only takes place when the ob-
served movements are of human origin and is not automatically
triggered by abstract non-human stimulation (Bertenthal, Longo,
& Kosobud, 2006) or robotic motion (Kilner, Paulignan, &
Blakemore, 2003). Whether a stimulus activates covert imitation
is, however, determined by whether the observer believes the
movement to be produced by a human or by a machine (see, e.g.,
Longo & Bertenthal, 2009; Stanley et al., 2007; Zwickel, 2009).
It has recently been suggested that the function of covert imi-
tation of observed human movements is a perceptual one. Accord-
ing to Wilson and Knoblich (2005), we covertly simulate observed
actions with our own motor system to derive predictions of future
states of the observed movements (Sparenberg, Springer, & Prinz,
2012; Springer et al., 2011; Tausche, Springer, & Prinz, 2009).
These predictions are thought to assist disambiguation of percep-
tual input during the course of the observed movement. Another
currently discussed suggestion is that the motor system assists the
perception of the temporal structure of observed movements (see,
e.g., Graf et al., 2007; Thornton & Knoblich, 2006). If, however,
the motor system has any functional role in the perception of
human movements, one would have to expect that, in a dual-task,
the impact of own movements (R1) on concurrent visual percep-
tion (S2) is fundamentally different for human movement S2 and
for abstract S2 (for a different account, however, see Engel, Burke,
Fiehler, Bien, & Rösler, 2008; Schubotz, 2007). The PCM has
been discussed in the context of mostly abstract S2. Static arrow-
heads, letters, or color patches have neither any structural nor
dynamic similarities with human motion displays. Thus, the PCM
cannot automatically be applied to motor effects on human move-
ment perception but requires explicit empirical generalization.
Motorvisual dual-task studies with human movements as S2 are
rare relative to studies with abstract S2. To our knowledge, the
only previous studies on this topic are by Bidet-Ildei and col-
leagues (Bidet-Ildei, Chauvin, & Coello, 2010; Bidet-Ildei, Spar-
row, & Coello, 2011), Jacobs and Shiffrar (2005), Miall et al.
(2006), and Christensen et al. (2011).
As discussed in the Motorvisual Facilitation subsection, Miall et
al.’s (2006) results, that hand movements facilitate the perception
discrimination of the spatially compatible hand movements, are
well in line with predictions of the PCM. Jacobs and Shiffrar
(2005) also applied continuous cyclical movements as R1 and S2.
In their design, passive standing, stationary treadmill-walking, and
stationary cycling movements as R1 were paired with a speed
discrimination task between two point-light walkers (Thornton,
2006) as S2. In the discrimination task, participants performed
worst when they were walking (i.e., performing the same type of
movement that they had to observe)—a motorvisual impairment
effect. It is, however, difficult to distinguish whether there was
categorical correspondence (type of movement) between R1 and
S2 or spatial (positions of the limbs during walking). Thus, the
prediction of the PCM would be ambiguous in this case.
Consequently, further research is required to determine whether
the PCM can also be applied to the perception of human motion.
In particular, tasks that allow a clear distinction to be made
between categorical and spatial consistency would be required.
The study by Christensen et al. (2011) indicates that the temporal
synchrony between R1 and S2 is another important factor to
consider in motor effects on biological motion perception.
Motor Induced Bias on Perceptual Judgment
Besides directly affecting perceptual accuracy, concurrent motor
activity can also bias perceptual judgments in one or the other
direction. Assimilative as well as contrastive motorvisual bias
effects have been found in dual-task studies (e.g., Beets et al.,
2010; Maruya, Yang, & Blake, 2007; Yabe & Taga, 2008;
Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2007, 2008). A motorvisual assimi-
lation bias means that S2 stimuli are judged to be more similar than
dissimilar to R1 responses. A motorvisual contrast bias, on the
other hand, refers to situations in which S2 stimuli are judged to be
more inconsistent than consistent with R1 (see Zwickel & Prinz,
2011, for definitions and a review of findings). An example of an
assimilative bias effect is a study by Kunde and Kiesel (2006).
They had participants observing a fast sequence of short light
flashes (S2) while executing a sequence of key presses (R1). The
number of observed flashes and executed key presses matched or
differed from trial- to-trial. Results showed that when the numbers
differed, the number of flashes was judged to be similar to the
number of key presses, instantiating a motorvisual assimilation
bias. Hamilton et al. (2004), on the contrary, observed a con-
trast bias from weight lifting on weight perception. Participants
lifted boxes of different weights (R1) while observing models
also lifting boxes of different weights (S2). When participants
lifted lighter boxes, the models’ boxes were judged to be
heavier. When they lifted heavy boxes, the models’ boxes were
judged to be rather light.
Motorvisual judgment bias is often interpreted as evidence for a
direct influence of action on perception, in the sense that concur-
rent action biases the perceptual process in one or the other
direction (see, e.g., Schubö et al., 2004). Motorvisual contrast bias
is usually discussed in analogy with the motorvisual impairment
phenomena, whereas motorvisual assimilation bias is usually seen
as analogous to motorvisual facilitation (e.g., Schu¨tz-Bosbach &
Prinz, 2007; Zwickel et al., 2010). Accuracy impairment and
contrast bias are regarded as rather “negative” influences of action
on perception, whereas accuracy facilitation and assimilative bias
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are seen as “positive” motorvisual effects (see Schu¨tz-Bosbach &
Prinz, 2007; Zwickel et al., 2010).
When contrast bias is associated with impairment and assimi-
lation bias is associated with facilitation, the PCM cannot account
for all previous motorvisual bias findings. For example, Zwickel et
al. (2007) found a contrast bias for clearly spatial R1–S2 consis-
tency, whereas the R1–S2 consistency in Kunde and Kiesel’s
(2006) assimilative bias was clearly categorical. These findings
run contrary to the prediction of the PCM, given that the bias
effects reflect direct influences from action planning or movement
control on perception.
This qualification should, however, not been seen as weakening
the PCM model, because it is questionable whether all of the
abovementioned bias effects are really due to influences from
motor activity on the perceptual processing. Instead of S2 percep-
tion itself, evaluative processes concerning the already perceived
S2 stimuli could have been influenced by R1. Such “motor-
evaluative” effects have been shown, for instance, by Topolinski
and Strack (2009) for action effects on stimulus-likability or by
Bach and Tibber (2007) for one’s own actions affecting attribution
of features to observed actors. If some of the motorvisual bias
phenomena are due to effects from action on evaluation, instead of
being due to effects from action on perception, it is not surprising
that the PCM’s predictions are not always met by motorvisual bias
findings. The predictions of the PCM can rather be seen as an
indicator for which of the bias effects can be ascribed to motor
effects on perception and which should rather be explained in
terms of motor effects on post-perceptual evaluative processes.
Note, however, that in the dual-task studies reviewed in the Mo-
torvisual Facilitation and Motorvisual Impairment subsections, the
main explanatory target of the PCM, cannot be ascribed to motor-
visual bias. Either the R1–S2 overlap was on a dimension different
from the S2–R2 task relevant dimension (e.g., Deubel et al., 1998;
Hommel & Schneider, 2002), or signal detection analyses have
shown action effects on sensitivity but not on criteria (e.g.,
Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010; Eder & Klauer, 2007; Mu¨sseler, Stein-
inger, & Wu¨hr, 2001).
Effects From Action on Perception in Single Tasks
Motorvisual effects have also been studied with single tasks.
These tasks typically require the participant to hold a response in
preparation while waiting for a Go-signal. The Go-signal is either
compatible or incompatible with the prepared response (e.g.,
Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta`, 1998). The common
finding is that response latencies are shorter when prepared action
and Go-signal match than when they do not (Hommel, 1996). For
example, Craighero et al. (1999) had participants prepare a grasp-
ing movement either aiming at a horizontal or at a vertical bar. The
Go-signal for execution of the movement was either a horizontal or
a vertical bar. Responses were initiated faster when the orientation
of the to-be grasped bar matched the orientation of the Go-signal.
These effects are often interpreted as being due to a facilitative
effect from action preparation on the perception of action compat-
ible stimuli (Bortoletto, Mattingley, & Cunnington, 2011; Craigh-
ero et al., 2002, 1999). The results of these studies are largely in
agreement with the PCM, because most of them show facilitative
effects, and the compatible dimensions are mostly spatial (see
Gozli & Pratt, 2011, for an exception). We did, however, not focus
the review so far on single tasks, because the interpretation of
compatibility effects in these tasks as motorvisual effects has
frequently been criticized (e.g., Miall et al., 2006; Vogt, Taylor, &
Hopkins, 2003). An alternative explanation for the observed facil-
itation effect could be that perception of the Go-signal facilitated
execution of the compatible response, as has been shown in many
visuomotor priming studies (e.g., Bub & Masson, 2010; Pavese &
Buxbaum, 2002; Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000; see Vogt
& Thomaschke, 2007, for a review).
Conclusions
We have proposed a new model—the PCM—to explain seem-
ingly contrasting findings from previous motorvisual priming re-
search. According to the proposed model, motorvisual impairment
is due to the binding of categorical representations in action plans,
and motorvisual facilitation is due to the activation of spatial
representations in movement control. The PCM predicts that mo-
torvisual impairment can be observed with categorical response–
stimulus overlap, and that motorvisual facilitation can be found
with spatial response–stimulus overlap. We have reviewed the
previous literature on motorvisual priming and have shown that the
currently available evidence indeed meets this prediction.
Further, we have discussed untested predictions from the PCM.
Motorvisual impairment should be sensitive to context, whereas
motorvisual facilitation should be unaffected by context manipu-
lations. With regard to the temporal dimension of both effects, we
would expect that motorvisual impairment and motorvisual facil-
itation should be effective throughout the whole course of a
movement.
The PCM has been introduced to explain findings in motorvi-
sual dual-task priming with manual actions. We have also sug-
gested that the model can be extended to further motorvisual
research areas, such as biological motion perception, or motorvi-
sual judgment bias. Such extensions would, however, require
further research.
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